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There have not been many empirical studies of the determination of  the pro- 
tection structures in  developing countries. Korea is no exception. Alikhani 
and Havrylyshyn (1982) (as quoted in Amelung [1989]) and Jwa (1988) are 
examples of the few studies of  Korea’s protection. The empirical part of Jwa 
investigates the determinants of the import liberalization that took place in the 
mid-1980s. This paper attempts to explain the political economy of the deter- 
mination of protection levels. 
Section 13.1 presents three different measures of nominal protection in Ko- 
rea for  1978, 1982, and  1988, the years for which data are available. The 
section also presents estimates of the effective rates of protection for 1978 and 
1982. It should be noted that nominal and effective protective rates are esti- 
mated only for domestic sales, not for total sales, as export sales cannot be 
protected. The  section also discusses the  salient features of  the protective 
structure and changes over time. 
Section 13.2 considers whether the political economy discussion of the pro- 
tection structure can be profitably applied to a developing country, in particu- 
lar, to Korea, where the influence of  elected representatives on trade policy 
matters has not been as strong as in the industrial democracies. Section 13.3 
estimates simple regression models of  the determination of  the nominal and 
effective protection structures and reports the results. Section 13.4 provides a 
brief summary and conclusion. 
13.1  The Protection Structure in Korea 
13.1.1  The Structure of Nominal Protection 
In tables 13.1-13.3,  tariffs, actual tariffs, and nominal rates of  protection 
(NRPs) are presented by primary sector and manufacturing three-digit KSIC 
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Table 13.1  The Structure of Nominal Protection in 1978 (%) 
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Note: Tariffs  are the rates  applied  to trade from July  1978 to June  1979. Actual tariffs were 
computed  for  1978. NRPs  are  based  on  the price  survey conducted  in  1982. The figures in 
parentheses refer to “all industries’’ excluding the agricultural sector. 
(Korea Standard Industrial Classification) industry. These sectors and indus- 
tries are aggregates of the more detailed industries in the Input-Output Tables 
that the Bank of  Korea estimated.’ The three different rates of nominal protec- 
1. The bank publishes the tables at different levels of aggregation. The ones used in this paper 
have about 160 industries, of which about 120 are producing tradable goods (the number differs 
for different years). 363  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
Table 13.2  The Structure of Nominal Protection in 1982 (%) 
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Note:  Tariffs  are the rates  applied  to trade  from July  1981 to June  1982. Actual tariffs were 
computed  for  1981. NRPs  are  based  on the price  survey conducted in  1982. The figures in 
parentheses refer to “all industries” excluding the agricultural sector. 
tion for a sector or KSIC industry shown in the tables are weighted averages 
of the respective rates for the input-output industries belonging to the sector 
or industry, the weights being the domestic sales evaluated at border prices. 
The tariff  for  an  industry  in  the  Input-Output Tables is an  unweighted, 
simple average of  the tariffs on imported products classified as belonging to 
the industry. The actual tariff for an input-output industry, in contrast, is the 
ratio of  the tariff revenue to the imports of the products belonging to the in- 364  Yo0 Jung-ho 
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Tahle 13.3  The Structure of Nominal Protection in 1988 (%) 
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Note:  Both tariffs and actual tariffs are for 1988. NRPs are based on the survey conducted in 
1990. The figures in parentheses refer to “all industries” excluding the agricultural sector. 
dustry less the imports of  the products for export production.  The latter im- 
ports were subtracted from the denominator because they were exempted from 
tariffs by the Tariff Act and their inclusion will understate the extent to which 
an industry’s domestic sales are protected by tariffs. 
An NRP is estimated, first, for an industry in the Input-Output Tables, by 
selecting one among the following three candidates: tariff,  actual tariff,  and 
the tariff equivalent of the price differential between the domestic and the in- 365  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
ternational price, which is also called the implicit tariff. In the selection, such 
things were taken into account as whether the products of an industry were 
being exported or were import competing, how large imports were compared 
to domestic demand, and whether there were nontariff barriers.2 It should be 
noted that the three candidates for the 1988 NRPs were tariffs and actual tariffs 
in  1988 and the tariff equivalents obtained from a price survey conducted in 
1990. 
In obtaining the averages presented in tables 13.1-1 3.3, the industries’ do- 
mestic sales evaluated in border prices (which were in turn obtained by deflat- 
ing the domestic sales by the NRPs) were used as weights. Thus weighted, 
the average rates indicate the extent by which the price of a basket of goods 
that are domestically produced and sold by an aggregate industry would in- 
crease as the result of import restrictions of  one form or another. 
The Differences among the Three Nominal Rates of Protection 
An interesting feature of the protection structure for 1978 and  1982 is that 
tariffs were generally much higher than actual tariffs and that the latter in turn 
tended to be higher than the NRPs. In table 13.1 for 1978, mining products 
provide an extreme example, where the actual tariff was less than 2 percent, 
while the tariff was nearly 18 percent, and the NRP was still smaller than the 
actual tariff. The average tariff for manufactured goods was 41 percent, the 
average actual tariff was 25 percent, and the average NRP was 20 percent. An 
important exception to this feature was the agricultural  sector, for which the 
NRP was much higher than the actual tariff. 
Korea’s Tariff Act allowed tariff exemptions and rebates on imported inputs 
for export production.  However,  this  was not  the reason why  actual tariffs 
were substantially lower than tariffs. Tariff-exempted imports for export pro- 
duction were  not counted  in calculating the reported actual tariffs,  as men- 
tioned earlier. The Tariff Act also allowed tariff exemptions for the intermedi- 
ate inputs used by defense industries and others that “lead the technological 
development” in the rest of the economy. Use of  tariff quotas could also be 
one of the reasons why actual tariffs were lower than tariffs. 
The obvious reason why NRPs tended to be lower than actual tariffs is that, 
for some products, the tariff equivalent implicit in the domestic to border price 
ratio was lower than the actual tariffs. Such a thing cannot happen if  the do- 
mestic and foreign products were identical. A domestic price lower than the 
border price plus tariff will prevent the product from being imported. Hence, 
no tariffs would be collected, and no actual tariff would be available.  How- 
ever, since most products can only be defined to include a spectrum of  differ- 
2. The tariff equivalents were estimated on the basis of a detailed survey of domestic and inter- 
national prices in  1982. The domestic to international price ratios were extrapolated backward to 
obtain the tariff equivalents for 1978. In the extrapolation, domestic and foreign price indices were 
used. Korea Development Institute (1982) reports the actual tariffs and NRPs for 1978 and 1982. 
The tariffs, actual tariffs, and nominal rates of protection in table 13.3 are newly estimated. 366  Yo0 Jung-ho 
entiated products, it can happen that imported goods at one end of the spec- 
trum have  after-tariff  prices  that  are  higher  than  the  average  price  of  the 
products in the domestic market. 
An  interesting  question  raised  by  the observed difference  between  tariffs 
and NRPs is why tariEs are maintained at levels “higher than necessary.” One 
possible explanation, related to external trade relations,  would be that tariffs 
are the outer wall  protecting  the ability to protect domestic industries,  with 
the difference between the tariffs or actual tariffs and NRPs constituting a buf- 
fer. Another likely explanation would be the internal one that the govcmment 
maintains  a considerable degree of  discretionary  power to intervene  in the 
market and to allocate favors between groups in the private sector. These hy- 
potheses cannot be fully explored  in this paper, but its investigation will be 
dircctcd  to  thc  related  issue  of  how  interindustry  differences  in  protection 
came into being. 
The tendency for tariffs to exaggerate the level of actual protection did not 
hold in the late 1980s, and the tendency had important exceptions in 1978 and 
1982. In the agricultural sector, the average NRP was higher than the average 
tariff, and the same was true for a number of individual industries in the man- 
ufacturing  sector, most  notably  for the machinery  industries.  An NRP of  a 
product  will  exceed the tariff  or actual tariff  if  there  are nontariff  barriers 
(NTBs) in addition to tariffs. 
This suggests that NTBs have been important policy instruments in protect- 
ing industries of low comparative advantage. Korea’s comparative advantage 
is very low in the agricultural sector even though that sector still accounts for 
a large proportion  of  the labor force, 38 percent in  1978 and 20 percent  in 
1989. The comparative advantage is also low in the production of  machines. 
Imports of all kinds of machinery  have been the major reason for trade defi- 
cits, which the country longs very  much to get rid of. If  NTBs were indeed 
important in protecting the sectors and industries with low comparative advan- 
tage, this  suggests that,  in Korea, the policymakers  and bureaucrats  in the 
administrative branch of  the government were playing a very influential role 
in  determining the structure of  protection,  for the  administration  of  NTBs 
generally  involves  a greater  degree of  discretion than the administration of 
tariff barriers. 
Changes Over Time 
The three tables presented above cover a period of about ten years from the 
late 1970s to the late 1980s. During that period, there was a sharp decline in 
tariffs. As a comparison of tables 13.  I  and 13.3 reveals, the average tariff for 
all industries  was halved  from 36  percent to about  18 percent.  This largely 
reflected the decline in the average tariff for the manufacturing sector from 41 
percent in 1978 to  18 percent in 1988 since the sector has much larger domes- 
tic sales than the other sectors. 
The average of actual tariffs for all industries was also halved from 23 per- 
cent to 12 percent  during the same period. Here again, the decline  largely 367  Political Economy of  Protection Structure in Korea 
reflects what happened to the actual tariffs in the manufacturing sector, which 
declined from 25 percent to 12 percent. A major part of the decline took place 
since 1982. 
In contrast to this trend in tariffs and actual tariffs, there was little change in 
the average NRP for all industries for the ten-year period. This was due mostly 
to the trends in the NRPs for the agricultural and manufacturing sectors offset- 
ting each other. On the one hand, the average NRP doubled from 50 percent 
to more than 100 percent in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, it de- 
clined from 20 percent to 13 percent in the manufacturing sector, roughly in 
line with what happened to tariffs and actual tariffs.3 
The variations in tariffs and actual tariffs tended to decline. At the bottoms 
of tables  13.1-13.3  are shown the standard deviations of the three protective 
rates for about 120 industries in the Input-Output Tables. The standard devia- 
tion of the tariffs was roughly halved between  1978 and 1988, and that of  the 
actual tariffs also declined sharply,  although  not  as rapidly.  In contrast, the 
standard  deviation  of  the  NRPs rose  steeply during  the  same period. Here 
again, the reason was the rise in the standard deviation of  the NRPs for the 
agricultural  sector. With that  sector excluded, the standard deviation of  the 
NRPs declined, although the pace was the slowest among the three rates of 
protection. 
13.1.2  The Structure of Effective Protection 
Table 13.4 presents estimates of the effective rates of protection (ERPs) for 
1978 and  1982 at the same level of industry aggregation as the ones used for 
nominal protection. To obtain these estimates, the NRPs were applied to the 
Input-Output Tables, after indirect taxes were subtracted from interindustry 
transactions and all inputs were reevaluated in domestic prices, and the “Cor- 
den method” (suggested in Corden [ 19661) was followed. At the time of esti- 
mation, the latest Input-Output Table available was that for 1978, and this was 
used in estimating the 1982 ERPs as well as the 1978 ERPs.~ 
The main features of the effective rates presented in table 13.4 are that the 
ERPs were  high  for the  agricultural  and  manufacturing  sectors  and  that, 
within the manufacturing  sector, the chemical and machinery  industries en- 
joyed high ERPs. 
The relation between the structure of effective protection and the compara- 
3. The NRPs for a number of  manufacturing industries show somewhat erratic fluctuations, 
especially for furniture, oil refinery, petroleum and coal products, rubber products, and plastic 
products,  between  1978 and  1982. The sharp decline in the NRP for furniture seems to reflect 
import liberalization. Kim (1988) notes that, in 1980, all items in the industry were under some 
kind of quantitative import restriction, although restrictions were lifted for over 60 percent of the 
items in  1983. The sharp increase in NRP for oil refining seems to reflect the rapid rise in  the 
energy price from 1978 to 1982, which was faster inside Korea than in the international market. 
For other industries,  no ready explanation seems available. In the cases of rubber products and 
plastic products,  the big  increases in  NRPs are likely to be  the results of  changes in  product 
composition in the industries. 
4. The method of estimating the effective rates of protection is discussed and reported in Yo0 
(1982), and the estimates are reported in Korea Development Institute (1982). 368  Yo0 Jung-ho 
Table 13.4  The Structure of Effective Protection (%) 
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Note: The figures in parentheses refer to “all industries” excluding the agricultural sector. 
tive advantage ranking seems worth mentioning.  Since Korea is a resource- 
poor country and therefore depends heavily on imports for its supply of  raw 
materials,  it does not  appear surprising  that the effective protection  is near 
zero for forestry, fishing, and mining. However, if comparative disadvantage 
were the reason for little or no protection for the primary sectors, the agricul- 
tural sector should also receive low effective protection. Instead, its protection 
was very high. 
In  the  manufacturing  sector,  the  effective  protection  was  higher  for the 369  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
heavy and chemical industries, in which Korea had relatively low comparative 
advantage. In contrast, most of  the so-called light industries producing con- 
sumer goods had low or negative effective protection. The major exceptions 
were tobacco, which was under government monopoly, and clothing. Other 
light  industries  such as furniture  and  paper  also  had  greater-than-average 
ERPs, but theirs were not exceptionally high. In the light industries with low 
or negative protection, Korea’s comparative advantage was high until the early 
1980s. These industries used to account for more than half of  all exports- 
and  they  still do if  electrical  machinery,  which mainly produces  consumer 
electronics products, is regarded as a light industry. 
These features of  the interindustry  structure  of  effective protection  were 
common  in  1978 and  1982. The change  between  the years  was that ERPs 
became larger on average,  but at the same time there was some noticeable 
decline in the effective protection rate for the machinery industries. The en- 
tries in table 13.4 for 1982 appear to suggest that the variation of ERPs among 
the industries diminished over the years. However, at the level of aggregation 
at which the regression analysis was conducted in this paper-namely,  where 
there are 120 or so tradable-goods-producing  input-output  industries-there 
was a tremendous rise in the standard deviation from 1978 to 1982. 
13.2  The Political Economy of Protection and the Demand and Supply 
Conditions in Korea 
The political economy discussion of the protection structure refers mostly 
to  industrial  countries  with  parliamentary  democracy.  As Baldwin  (1982) 
notes, the discussion usually postulates a political marketplace where elected 
representatives are regarded  as the suppliers of  protection  and producers as 
the demanders. In the market, the effective demand for protection is expressed 
in ballot box votes rather than dollar votes. Thus, the question arises whether 
the political economy of protection is relevant to a developing country where 
a democratic tradition is not firmly established. 
What makes the political economy discussion useful is that the demand for 
protection exists and is transmitted in some form to the people who can pro- 
vide it. The institutional feature that the suppliers are the elected representa- 
tives seems to be of  incidental importance.  In a developing country, the sup- 
pliers  could  be  authoritarian  rulers  or  government  bureaucrats.  In  the 
following sections, the demand and supply conditions of  protection in Korea 
will be discussed. 
13.2.1 
An Industry’s Demand for Protection 
The basic logic underlying the collective action expounded by Mancur 01- 
son (1965) would differ little across countries.  In particular,  the ease or dif- 
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ficulty  of  organizing  a group and having  it  take collective  action does not 
depend mainly on whether a country has a long-established tradition of parlia- 
mentary democracy.  Insofar as the objective that collective action attempts to 
achieve has the nature of a public good, the free-rider problem exists in any 
country. 
As there are no professional lobbyists in Korea, industry associations tend 
to play that role to a certain extent, and the industrialists themselves attempt 
to influence trade and other policies. In any case, the contribution of one’s 
own time and money to a collective cause would be more easily forthcoming 
if the beneficiaries were few in number. Hence, the higher an industry’s con- 
centration ratio, the more likely that there will be collective action for protec- 
tion. 
In addition to the likelihood of  collective action, how great an effort will 
actually be made will depend on the expected  reward.  What may be safely 
disregarded in a large economy, but not in a smaller one, are exports. In Ko- 
rea, exports are about one-third as large as the country’s GNP. Since protec- 
tion  of  an  industry  obviously  cannot  increase  its  export  sales, an  industry 
would not be much interested in lobbying for protection if its output is mostly 
exported. 
Demand for Protection by Politicians and the Governmenl 
Elected representatives are usually portrayed as the suppliers of protection. 
But  it seems appropriate  to view them  as the demanders. Compared to the 
benefits they get in the form of ballot box votes, the costs they incur seem 
small. What works as the constraint on the provision of  protection is the op- 
position to it. The stronger the opposition, the harder it is to obtain protection. 
Thus, one may say that society as a whole is the supplier of protection and 
that the supply cost is expressed in the form of opposition. 
Similarly, the government (mainly  the executive  branch)  can  also be re- 
garded as the demander. According to the adding machine model as referred 
to in Caves (1976), the government tries to gain as many votes as possible in 
setting tariffs or other barriers to maximize the probability of  reelection.  Al- 
though the model assumes a democratically elected government, it is not dif- 
ficult to see that the model can also be applied to less democratic countries, 
once we recognize that no government can be effective, however authoritarian 
it may be, if it turns the majority of the population against it. People’s confi- 
dence in a government would depend a great deal on whether it appears to be 
protecting  their  interests. Thus, the number  of  workers  in an industry  is a 
variable that would be duly considered in decisions on trade policy. 
An important related factor that would be most relevant in this regard is the 
sympathy given  by  the  general public  to  a  particular  group of  workers, 
namely, the farmers. It seems universal  that  the plight of  rural people  gets 
sympathy from the rest of the country. That sympathy seems to be exception- 
ally  strong  in  Korea.  Because of  the  rapid  urbanization  that  accompanied 371  Political Economy of  Protection Structure in Korea 
Korea’s rapid  economic growth, more than  three-quarters  of  urbanites  are 
first-generation migrants from rural areas, where their parents, brothers, and 
sisters  are still working. They seem no less offended by  the  suggestion  of 
opening the agricultural  market than rural  workers are. Hence, the govern- 
ment cannot afford to appear to be turning its back on the farmers. 
The Government’s Own Agenda 
The governments of  many developing countries assume the role of  devel- 
opment state, and Korea is an exemplary case. Since the late President Park 
took power in a military coup and the next president, Chun, similarly lacked 
constitutional legitimacy, the governments of these two presidents attempted 
to obtain legitimacy on the basis of economic performance. The political elite 
maintained  a  strong economic bureaucracy  and protected  it  from interest- 
group politics.  This meant that the ideas and initiatives of the bureaucrats in 
various economic ministries mattered a great deal. In this regard, the political 
economy of protection in Korea seems substantially different from that in in- 
dustrial democracies in that the economic ministries are not mere implemen- 
ters of the decisions made by somebody else but should be viewed rather as 
the important decision  makers themselves. They have their own agenda for 
the economy, independent of ballot box politics. 
Korean bureaucrats seem to be heavily influenced by the Japanese model. 
Geographic proximity  and cultural  affinity, coupled  with the fact that Japan 
was once a latecomer to economic development, tend to make the Japanese 
experience appear highly relevant to Korea. Since Japan’s economic success 
is often  attributed, rightly  or wrongly,  to its protectionist  trade policy  and 
industrial targeting policy, the adoption of similar policies is often believed to 
be a shortcut to rapid growth. 
On the other hand, Korea’s own experience with the so-called heavy and 
chemical industry policy of the 1970s convinced  many policymakers  of the 
need to liberalize the trade regime. The policy, a typical industrial targeting 
policy, attempted to promote the development of  selected industries through 
heavy protection, a strongly biased credit and interest rate policy, and tax in- 
centives.  It gave rise to excess investments  in the policy-favored  industries, 
rapid inflation,  and a deterioration  of economic performance. The policy  is 
understood to have been one of the main causes of  the real decline in exports 
in the late 1970s and the negative economic growth in 1980. The fact that the 
policy was discontinued in the spring of  1979 by the same government that 
launched it is evidence that there were many in the government who believed 
the policy to be a mi~take.~ 
5. Some support to the views expressed in this paragraph may be found in Yo0 (1990), which 
discusses the background of the heavy and chemical industry policy and attempts to evaluate the 
effects on resource allocation among the manufacturing industries and on the industries’ export 
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Out of these two conflicting lessons, Japanese and Korean, arose the order 
of import liberalization that has been followed in the 1980s. The government 
liberalized those industries first that were either strongly competitive in inter- 
national markets or not competitive at all. The industries in the middle of this 
competitiveness ranking (although it is not clear how the ranking was deter- 
mined) were given a few more years of  protection in the hope that they would 
become more competitive  in the meantime. The policy  was a sort of  infant 
industry protection. Thus, the relation between competitiveness and the order 
of liberalization was not “linear.” 
13.2.2  The Supply Condition of Protection: The Opposition 
Protection  necessarily  implies higher prices, lower quality, or a combina- 
tion of  both to users of the imports and their domestic  substitutes.  The ad- 
versely affected users have the incentive to oppose the protection. Just as suc- 
cessful lobbying by producers provides a collective good, protection, so does 
successful  opposition  by  users,  no protection. Whether  and how much the 
opposition succeeds will depend on the ability of  users to take collective ac- 
tion. Thus, there seems to be the same issue of collective action on the user 
side. 
Opposition  would be least likely if  the protection is for a consumer good. 
In general, it would be difficult to organize a group and take collective action 
when the benefit from doing so is thinly and widely spread. This is typical of 
most consumer goods. Thus, an industry’s lobby for protection is less likely 
to be opposed and more likely to succeed if its output is a consumer good. 
The opposition to protection can come from the industries that use as inputs 
the protected goods. Amelung (1989) proposes to measure it by the index of 
forward linkage opposition. The index incorporates the importance of  a pro- 
tected industry’s output as an input to the user industries and the latter’s con- 
centration ratios. He also develops a measure for an industry, say, industry A, 
that indicates how strong those industries’ demand for protection will be that 
produce the inputs that the industry uses, the index of backward linkage op- 
position. 
In the previous subsection, the Korean government was seen as a demander 
of protection. It assumes the role of opponent, too. For decades, one of  the 
primary concerns of  the economic ministries has been export expansion. The 
late President Park and the whole government gave the highest policy priority 
to ensuring that export performance was the best it could be, and the general 
public also used to be highly concerned with export performance. This atti- 
tude has changed little. Given the national concern, it would not be surprising 
if the economic ministries paid attention to the negative effects of raising pro- 
tective barriers on export performance. Under the circumstances,  exporters 
would be more effective than otherwise in persuading the economic ministries 
of the need to reduce or eliminate protection on  the intermediate inputs they 
use. 373  Political Economy of  Protection Structure in Korea 
13.3  Estimation of a Regression Model 
This section investigates the determination of the interindustry difference in 
protection by estimating simple regression models on the basis of the discus- 
sion in the last section. It first describes the independent variables to be used 
and discusses the estimation results. 
An  “observation”  in  the regression  analysis  is an  industry  in  the Input- 
Output Tables of the Korean economy for the nearest year estimated by the 
Bank of  Korea. The unit of  observation  was convenient because  the Input- 
Output Tables can supply data on industry characteristics that may be used as 
independent variables. 
13.3.1  Independent Variables 
While the nominal rates of protection (NRPs) and the effective rates (ERPs) 
discussed above were used as the dependent variables, the independent vari- 
ables to be included in the regression analysis were chosen on the basis of the 
discussion in the previous section. 
The concentration ratio (CR) is included as a determinant of the likelihood 
for an industry to take collective action for protection and the intensity of  that 
action.  Unpublished estimates of CRs by KDI researchers were available for 
five-digit KSIC manufacturing  industries.  The estimated CR for an industry 
represents  the  proportion of  shipments accounted  for by  the  three  largest 
firms. As the five-digit KSIC industries are more disaggregated than the input- 
output industries of this study, the value of  shipments was used as a weight to 
obtain an average CR for an input-output industry. The CRs for industries in 
the agricultural, forestry, fishing, and mining sectors were assumed to be zero. 
Other determinants of collective action that were used as independent vari- 
ables were the proportion of  value added (VA) and the proportion of  exports 
in the industry’s output (EO). The smaller the VA, the greater the effective 
protection to an industry, given a protective measure on the output. Also, how 
much an industry would be interested in securing protection for itself is likely 
to be negatively correlated to EO. The VAs and EOs were obtained from the 
Input-Output Tables. The benefit to a protected industry will also depend on 
the elasticity of the domestic supply. However, the elasticity estimates were 
not available and could not be included. 
The variables chosen to represent the politicians’ and the government’s in- 
terests in ballot box votes were the number of  workers in an industry (L) and 
a dummy variable for the agricultural sector (AG). Representing the govern- 
ment’s own agenda for the Korean economy,  a dummy variable  (HCI) was 
included to distinguish from others the favored industries: iron and steel, non- 
ferrous metal, fabricated metal, all kinds of machinery  industries,  industrial 
chemicals, and oil refining. 
As mentioned in the last section, in the trade liberalization of the 1980s the 
government lifted protection first from the most and least competitive indus- 374  Yo0 Jung-ho 
tries. To represent  this policy of  infant industry protection,  it was hypothe- 
sized that the level of protection first rises and then falls as the import depen- 
dency ratio  (MD) increases  from zero to  one, MD being the proportion of 
domestic demand met by imports. To capture the nonlinear relation, MD and 
its square (MD2) were  included  in the regression  model.  MD was obtained 
from the Input-Output Tables by taking the ratio of  imports to domestic ab- 
sorption of the relevant products. 
As a variable representing the opposition to protection, or the lack of it, the 
directly consumed proportion  of an industry’s output (C) was included as an 
independent  variable in the regression  with the expectation that it would be 
positively correlated with the level of protection. 
The ability of other industries to oppose the protection of a given industry 
is represented  by the index of  forward linkage opposition  (FL). Hence, the 
higher  FL is for an  industry,  the  lower the industry’s  protection  level. The 
index  was  computed using  the input-output  coefficients  and the  CRs men- 
tioned above, as suggested by Amelung (1989). The index of  backward link- 
age opposition (BL) is also computed. BL for an industry represents the com- 
bined abilities to obtain nominal protection for themselves of the producers of 
the inputs that  the industry  uses, and it  is supposed  to adversely affect the 
industry’s effective protection. The formulas for FL and BL are the following: 
FL,  = ‘C,a, CR,,  for i f j, 
BL,  = Cp,, CR,,  forj #  i, 
where a,, stands for the input from the ith industry for a unit output of the jth 
industry and CR, for the concentration ratio of thejth industry. 
The opposition to protection can come from within the government itself. 
In view of  the fact that the export performance has been the national concern 
in Korea, the effects of protection  on the export industries could have been 
given due consideration  in the decision-making process on tariff and nontariff 
measures. Thus, it may be hypothesized that the inputs into export production 
would  have  low  protection, other things  being  equal. Thus, the  following 
measure of indirect exports (IE) was obtained from the Input-Output  Tables 
and included in the regression: 
IEt = E,rl,E,,  for i  # j, 
where r,, is the 0th element in the inverse matrix of  [I - A], A  being  the 
input-output coefficient matrix, and E,  is exports by thejth industry. 
Finally, the intensities in physical capital (PK) and human capital (HK) are 
included. They are the measures of  industrial characteristics in the tradition of 
the  factor  proportions theory  of  international  trade. An empirical  study of 
Korea’s protection  structure by Alikhani and Havrylyshyn  (1982) found the 
human capital intensity to have a significant positive correlation with the level 
of protection. Following Balassa and Bawens (1988), the “flow” measures of 
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PK,  = V, -  w,, 
HK, = W~ -  UW,, 
where v,, w,, and uwl stand for the value added per worker, the average wage 
rate, and the wage rate of unskilled workers in industry i.  As uw,’s were not 
available, the minimum of the average wage rates among all industries was 
used  in its  place.  Thus, HK  is statistically little different from the  average 
wage rate, w,,  in the regression analysis that follows. 
13.3.2  The Estimation Results 
The Determination of Nominal Rates of Protection 
The regression models, estimated by the ordinary least squares method of 
determination of NRPs for 1978, 1982, and 1988, are presented in table 13.5. 
According  to the results for 1978, the regressors whose estimated coeffi- 
cients turned out to be statistically significant  and have the expected  signs 
were the proportion of exports in an industry’s output (EO) in the group of the 
determinants representing  the industry’s demand for protection,  the number 
of workers (L) representing the politician’s demand, the dummy (HCI) for the 
government-favored  heavy  and  chemical  industries and  import dependency 
(MD) representing the government’s agenda, and the proportion of output pur- 
chased by the consumers (C) representing the lack of opposition to protection. 
Thus, the government appears to have been an active force behind protec- 
tion.  Because  of  political  considerations,  a higher  level of  protection  was 
given to the industries where the number of workers was large, and the gov- 
ernment protected those industries that it was promoting under the so-called 
heavy and chemical industry policy during the 1970s. 
The private sector appears to have been an inactive bystander. Of the deter- 
minants representing the industry’s demand for protection, the concentration 
ratio  (CR) and the proportion  of  value added in output (VA) had expected 
signs but were not statistically significant. And the protection  was higher if 
the protected  was more of  a consumer good, a high C, or if the industry was 
less interested in securing protection, a high EO. 
The reason why the industry was inactive may have been that lobbying for 
protection was not rewarding enough during the 1970s, when the government 
was strongly pushing the heavy and chemical industry policy. As the estima- 
tion result indicates,  what mattered most in determining the protection level 
one can enjoy was  whether  one belonged  to the  industries favored  by  the 
policy. 
The estimation for 1982 portrays a somewhat different picture. Of the group 
of regressors representing the government’s agenda for the economy, the coef- 
ficients of the variables for infant industry protection (MD and MD2) became 
significant with the expected  signs, replacing the dummy for HCI, and the 
coefficient of  the flow measure of human capital (HK) showed a positive sign 
of high significance. Thus, the estimation results seem to reflect the fact that, 376  Yo0 Jung-ho 
Table 13.5  Determinants of Nominal Rates of Protection 
Regressors  1978  1982  1988 
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by  1982, the government had discontinued  the heavy and chemical industry 
policy. However, the government still appears to have been the active force 
behind protection, promoting the development of infant industry and protect- 
ing the human capital-intensive  industries. 
To be noted parenthetically is the implication of the magnitudes of  the esti- 
mated coefficients for MD and MD2. Import dependency (MD) was expected 
to have such a diminishing influence on protection that, as MD rises, the pro- 
tection level goes up, reaches a peak, and declines. This expectation was not 
met. The coefficient  of  MDZ  was negative,  but  its magnitude  was not large 
enough for the protection level to decline. That is, as MD increases, the rise 377  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
in the protection level indeed decelerated,  but not rapidly enough. The esti- 
mated  magnitudes indicate that MD’s influence peaked  when it was slightly 
bigger than 100 percent, the theoretical maximum for MD. 
Compared to  1978, the  influence  of politics  on protection seems to have 
become stronger in  1982. Not only the number  of  workers (L) but also the 
dummy for agriculture (AG) became significant with the expected signs. 
The private business sector appears to have become more active in  1982. 
The concentration  ratio (CR), which became significant, indicates that,  the 
more concentrated an industry, the higher the protection level for that industry. 
Thus, in  determining  the  1982 protection  structure,  the  influence of  the 
government’s agenda does not appear to be as dominant as it was in 1978 but 
had to compete with ballot box politics and with more assertive private busi- 
ness interests. 
The estimated results for 1988 were very different from those for 1978 or 
1982 and difficult to interpret.  First, the proportion of value added in output 
(VA) and  the  index of  forward linkage opposition  (FL) had  coefficients of 
unexpected  signs with high statistical significance. Three independent vari- 
ables had  coefficients  of  expected  signs  with  statistical  significance.  They 
were the concentration ratio (CR), the dummy for agriculture (AG), and indi- 
rect exports (IE). 
In the estimation result for 1988, the government does not appear to have 
been active. Although IE was estimated to be a statistically significant vari- 
able, the influence of the government represented by it is a passive one, as it 
represents its resistance to the private sector’s demand for protection. This is 
no match to the influence it had in earlier years, when it was implementing the 
heavy and chemical industry policy (represented by the HCI dummy),  or to 
the  promotion  of  infant  industries  and  human  capital-intensive  industries 
(represented by MD and MD2). Thus, insofar as the estimated results reflect 
reality, the influence of the government having its own agenda for the econ- 
omy was not apparent in the late 1980s. 
However, it cannot be said that the finding is beyond any reasonable doubt. 
As noted at the outset, tariffs were from 1988, and the tariff equivalents from 
which the NRPs were chosen came from 1990. Thus, a new estimation with a 
more accurate set of data may produce a different finding. 
Determination of  the Effective Rates of  Protection 
The regression model for the determination of effective rates of protection 
included all the independent variables used for nominal rates of protection and 
an additional one representing the backward  linkage opposition (BL), which 
affects the ERPs but not the NRPs. The estimation results for 1978 and 1982 
are presented in table 13.6. Interpretation of  the estimation results needs to 
refer to the estimation of the determination of NRPs since an industry’s ERP 
is determined by the relative sizes of the NRPs given to the output of and the 
inputs into the industry. 378  Yo0 Jung-ho 
Table 13.6  Determinants of Effective Rates of Protection 
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In the model  estimated for 1978, only the dummy variable for heavy and 
chemical industries (HCI) and the proportion of output purchased by consum- 
ers (C) had coefficients with the expected signs with high  statistical  signifi- 
cance. These coefficients were also estimated to have statistically significant, 
expected signs in the  1978 regression for the NRPs.  Thus, the tendency  of 
higher effective protection for the heavy and chemical industries and for those 
industries producing consumer goods seems to be the “intended results.” 
Other regressors,  such as the proportion  of  value added in output (VA), 
backward  linkage opposition  (BL), and  human  capital intensity  (HK), had 
coefficients with “wrong” signs with high significance. The interpretation  is 
not straightforward. On the one hand, since the coefficient of  VA  in the NRP 379  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
determination  model had an insignificant but expected minus sign, the esti- 
mation  in the ERP determination  model appears to be  a result,  neither ex- 
pected nor intended, that merely shows the net effect of protecting inputs and 
outputs at different rates. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of HK was estimated to have the same, 
negative sign in both models of NRP and ERP determination. What does the 
statistical significance in the latter model  mean? Does it mean that the csti- 
mated  results  reflect  the  intentions of  lobbyists,  politicians,  or government 
officials? Or is it merely a spurious statistical correlation? Without additional 
independent information, the answer is not clear. 
In the estimation of the 1982 ERP determination model, the same problem 
occurs with regard to VA. CR and L were the only two independent variables 
that had coefficients of expected sign that were statistically significant. Their 
coefficients had expected signs of statistical significance, too, in the NRP de- 
termination model.  Thus, it appears that business interests and political con- 
siderations had a significant influence on the determination of ERPs in 1982. 
HCI  was  not  a significant factor in the  1982 determination  of ERPs, as it 
ceased to be one in the NRP determination. 
It is interesting to note that MD and HK, which represent the government’s 
own agenda, were estimated to be significant factors in the NRP determination 
but not in the ERP determination.  Insofar as the data used in the estimation 
were correct, the results of the two estimations seem to indicate that the indus- 
try  structure of  ERPs that the government intended to bring  about through 
import restraints was not achieved. 
13.4  Summary and Conclusion 
The tariff structure across industries hardly supplies sufficient information 
for the protection  structure  in Korea. Tariffs were much higher than  actual 
tariffs or estimated nominal rates of protection. Also, variation across indus- 
tries in tariffs is very much different from variation in NRPs. This difference 
suggests  that  NTBs are  an  important  factor  in  determining  the  protection 
structure,  and the  importance  of  NTBs  in  turn  suggests that  the executive 
branch of the government has been influential in determining nominal protec- 
tion. 
Between 1978 and 1988, tariffs and actual tariffs substantially declined, but 
the average NRP for all industries rose owing to a steep rise in the rate for the 
agricultural  sector.  For  other sectors,  the  NRPs  declined,  but more  slowly 
than  tariffs or actual tariffs.  Thus, the buffer between  tariffs and NRPs has 
diminished.  The tendency for NRPs to exceed tariffs or actual tariffs for the 
agricultural sector and the machinery industries changed little during the ten- 
year period covered in this paper. 
In the determination of nominal protection, the political consideration rep- 
resented by either the agriculture dummy (AG) or the number of workers (L) 380  Yo0 Jung-ho 
was found to have a significant influence. The government’s own agenda for 
the economy had  a  strong influence  on the protection  structure  in the  late 
1970s and in the early 1980s, but it appears to have become insignificant later. 
In contrast, the influence of private interests represented by CR was not appar- 
ent in the late 1970s but became stronger in later years. 
The opposition to protection had an influence on the protection structure in 
the passive sense that consumer goods tended to be protected more heavily. 
The forward and backward  linkage opposition (FL and BL) standing for an 
industry’s opposition to the protection of the producers of its inputs were not 
found to be significant. The exporters’ opposition to protecting the producers 
of its inputs, represented by IE, was found to be significant in the late 1980s. 
The proportion of  value added in output (VA) was not found to be signifi- 
cant, except that it was once estimated to be significant, but with a coefficient 
of unexpected  sign. Physical capital (PK) as an industrial characteristic was 
not  found to have  any  significant  correlation  with  the  nominal  protection 
structure. 
The structure of  effective protection  seems similar to that of  nominal pro- 
tection in that agriculture and the machinery industries were the major bene- 
ficiaries and the light industries producing consumer goods were the victims. 
Notable exceptions to this  in the light industries  were tobacco, which  was 
under government monopoly, and clothing. 
The estimation of the effective protection determination  was less satisfac- 
tory than that of  the nominal protection determination. In the late 1970s, the 
heavy and chemical industry policy was estimated to have had a strong influ- 
ence on the effective protection structure. Effective protection also tended to 
be higher for those industries for which the proportion of output purchased by 
the consumers was high. In the early 1980s, the concentration ratio and the 
number of  workers  had a significant,  positive influence on effective protec- 
tion. Besides these variables, however, most of the others were found to have 
little influence, while  the coefficients of  a few regressors were estimated to 
have unexpected signs with high statistical significance. 
The fact that the estimated results of the regression  models were statisti- 
cally more significant for the structure of nominal protection than for that of 
effective protection  makes one wonder whether the effective or the nominal 
protection structure better reflects the political economy of protectionism, es- 
pecially in the context of a developing country. The only reason why one may 
expect the structure of effective protection to better reflect the forces of polit- 
ical economy seems to be that the value added should be what ultimately mat- 
ters to those who attempt to obtain protection. 
However, effective rates of protection can be affected only through nominal 
rates of protection. Thus, efforts would first be directed toward gaining nomi- 
nal protection for oneself and opposing nominal protection for the producers 
of the inputs that one needs. The effective rate of  protection is the net results 
of countless such efforts by many. Thus, less information would be contained 381  Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea 
in the effective rates than in the nominal rates of protection about the political 
economy of protection. 
Moreover, when the government pushes its own agenda for the economy, 
what the final outcome of lobbying efforts will be is less predictable.  If the 
government merely  implemented  what is determined by interest group poli- 
tics, for example, lobbyists and interest groups would understand sooner or 
later what produces the most desired results and act accordingly. Government 
intervention  in  effect  introduces  noise in  this  feedback  process.  Hence,  it 
seems that the structure of nominal protection is a better object to investigate 
than that of effective protection for the study of the political economy of pro- 
tection. 
Finally, an interesting question, as Korean society is becoming more dem- 
ocratic, is what will happen to the protection  structure? The significance of 
democratization  for the subject of  this paper would be that the influence of 
politicians  and industries rises relative to the economic ministries and their 
technical bureaucrats.  In terms of the discussion presented above, on the one 
hand,  it will  imply  that the  influence of  such variables  as the  agricultural 
dummy and the  number of  workers  in an industry  will  become more pro- 
nounced. On the other hand, interest groups are likely to become more active, 
raising the influence of such variables as the concentration ratio on the deter- 
mination of the protection structure. 
To some extent, these changes seem to have already been taking place, as 
the regression results indicated. Despite the changes, however, the pattern of 
protection across industries does not appear to have substantially changed. As 
mentioned  earlier,  besides the agricultural  sector, the machinery  industries 
had consistently enjoyed higher than average NRPs during the ten-year period 
considered  in this  study. Since nontariff barriers  are the important factor in 
determining NRPs and the barriers are administered by the executive branch 
of the government, the apparent consistency in the protection structure seems 
to indicate that the strength of government influence on the protection struc- 
ture was not substantially affected. 
Whether it will remain strong in the future is a question that  no one can 
answer with certainty. Moreover, the pressure from the international commu- 
nity for an opening of Korean markets has been and will continue to be strong. 
Thus, the government has to compete with politicians,  industrialists, and the 
international community for influence on the protection structure. 
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Comment  Anne 0.  Krueger 
This is an excellent paper, one that greatly increases our understanding of the 
political economy of protection in developing countries. Yo0 has done a thor- 
oughly professional and careful job with the data he could obtain. As always 
with a newly explored area, however, a good analysis raises more questions 
than it answers. These comments are therefore largely devoted to raising ad- 
ditional considerations and, as such, to asking for further work in yet other 
papers. 
A first question concerns the political economy of differences between tar- 
iffs, actual tariffs, nominal  rates of protection,  effective rates of  protection, 
and nontariff barriers to trade. In Yoo’s  paper,  as elsewhere in the political 
economy literature, it  is always taken  for granted  that  the determinants  of 
these different rates may be different. Yet, if political economy questions are 
the focal point of  analysis, it seems that there should be at least some indica- 
tion as to why politicians choose the protective instruments that they do and a 
theory as to why there should be differences between these different rates- 
especially between various versions of nominal tariff rates. 
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A second question arises from Yoo’s discussion of the importance of export 
performance in the Korean context. From other work, there has been consid- 
erable emphasis on the divergence between Korean rates of protection for the 
home market and for export. Yo0 notes that account should have been taken 
of the negative effects of protection on exports. Yet, as is well known, protec- 
tion to some is deprotection to others. And, in Yoo’s data, all industries re- 
ceived positive protection.  Surely something is missing. Could the data con- 
sist  of  averages  of  protection  for the  domestic market  and  protection  for 
export? Does it make sense to examine only the rates of protection for one? 
This is not a criticism of  Yo0 because these questions remain unanswered 
throughout the literature on political economy. It would be interesting to see 
if  Yo0  could extend his analysis to effective rates of subsidy for exports and 
contrast the results to those he obtains with his present estimates. 
A third question pertains to the data and the inferences drawn with respect 
to changes over time. Yo0 has three data points:  1978, 1982, and 1988. It is 
interesting to note how individual rates fluctuate between these points, espe- 
cially if one examines effective rates (which are perhaps the most economi- 
cally meaningful in the absence of  a theory as to why nominal rates are of 
concern). Examination of table  13.4 suggests very large changes in rates in 
just four years. The most glaring cases that leap out are oil refineries, whose 
ERP is estimated at 26 percent in 1978 and 682 percent in 1982! However, the 
most significant change between  1978 and  1982 is in the much greater stan- 
dard deviation of rates in the later year. 
These observations raise several questions. First, how much “noise” is there 
in  year-to-year  changes in  ERPs? This phenomenon  has  been  observed  in 
other studies and is not unique to Korea. If, however, noise is substantial, it 
may be dangerous to use point observations four, or even ten, years apart as a 
basis for inferences about changes in political economy. Given the evolution 
of Korean trade policies over the past forty years, one would conjecture that 
major changes occurred in the early 196Os, in the early 1970s, and then again 
in the  late  1980s. Why one would  expect much change between  1978 and 
1982 is not clear. And, before  analysis of changes to 1988 can be reliable, 
questions about the variance of ERP rates from year to year need to be ad- 
dressed. 
There is one final comment-and  that is that  1978 and  1982 were years 
during which Korean economic policy was still managed almost entirely by 
technocrats.  Considerations  of economic growth and maintaining the export 
drive were highly important in their decision-making  process.  By  1988, the 
Korean government had become much more responsive to democratic forces. 
It was probably too early in 1988 for interest groups to have built up in support 
of  or opposition  to protection, but one would expect these forces to operate 
differently than they did under the earlier regime. An interesting question for 
political economy will be to examine and analyze the differences in the deter- 
minants of protection in Korea in the 1990s from those factors that influenced 
protection levels in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 384  Yo0 Jung-ho 
COnMIIent  Chia Siow Yue 
This is an excellent paper, providing much information on and an analysis of 
industrial protection in Korea. 
I have four comments about Yoo’s presentation of measures of  nominal and 
effective  rates  of  protection. First, the data show tariffs,  actual tariffs,  and 
nominal rates of protection.  Yo0  states that NTBs seem to have been an im- 
portant factor in protecting the industries of low comparative advantage such 
as agriculture  and machinery. It is not clear from the paper what NTBs are 
used in Korea. Second, subsidies appear to be missing in the computations. 
Yet it is well known that Korea makes liberal use of subsidies to promote its 
industries, in particular,  preferential  credit  provided  by the state-controlled 
banking system. Third, the data for nominal protection  are for 1978, 1982, 
and  1988, and the data for effective protection  are for 1978 and  1982. The 
analysis of  the changes over time appears incomplete.  The major import lib- 
eralization  efforts in Korea took place only in recent years, and the effects 
would be felt mainly  after  1988. It would  have been highly  informative  if 
more recent  data were  available to show the extent of  import  liberalization 
that has taken place to date. Fourth, Yo0 states that the effective rates of pro- 
tection tended to be minimal or negative for the industries of high comparative 
advantage, except for clothing and electrical machinery.  It would be instruc- 
tive if there were measures of the effective rates of subsidies in these industries 
as well. 
I have  four comments on Yoo’s  examination of  the political economy of 
protection. First, I agree with his argument that the political economy of  pro- 
tection in industrial democracies is different from that in developing countries 
like Korea, where the democratic tradition is not as firmly established and/or 
where the government assumes the role of  the developmental state. In such 
countries, the suppliers of  protection could be authoritarian rulers or govern- 
ment bureaucrats, and the demand for protection could come not only from 
industrialists,  workers,  and  farmers  but  also from the  government  itself, 
namely, the economic ministries  and bureaucrats.  The regression results for 
1978 did indicate that the most important determinant of the protection level 
was whether the industry is one favored by government industrial policy. Sec- 
ond, except for agriculture, the demand for protection in countries like Korea 
is determined by the desire to promote industrialization,  protect infant indus- 
tries, and hasten the emergence of dynamic comparative advantage, whereas 
in the industrial democracies it is usually determined by the desire to protect 
sunset industries losing their competitive edge. It is a well-known fact that the 
Korean  government is  active  in  industrial  targeting  and  picking  winners. 
Third, the political  economy of  protection  may  vary  between  the  import- 
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substitution and the export-orientation phases. Under the former, the demand 
is for tariff and nontariff protection,  but,  under the latter, the demand is for 
subsidies to promote export performance.  Fourth, the political  economy of 
import liberalization may be different from that of  protection. Yo0  seems to 
indicate that, convinced of the mistake of promoting heavy and chemical in- 
dustries in  the  1970s,  Korean  policymakers  moved  toward  import liberali- 
zation in the  1980s. My question is, Was  it a unilateral decision of  Korean 
policymakers,  or was there external pressure  as well? It would  appear that 
U.S. pressure  has had  some effect on the  import  liberalization  schedule in 
Korea. 